The resurgence of the Challenger nameplate in recent years evokes a mix of emotions, especially for those who were involved in the creation of the original models. As the Director of Product Planning at the time, I championed the 1970 “E” Body Barracuda and Challenger project, a venture filled with both high hopes and, ultimately, some painful realities.
In the late 1960s, the automotive landscape was captivated by the rise of “compact specialty cars,” or “pony cars” as the automotive press affectionately called them. Models like the Ford Mustang, Mercury Cougar, Chevrolet Camaro, Pontiac Firebird, and AMC Javelin were dominating the market. Recognizing this burgeoning segment, we at Chrysler embarked on developing our own contenders: the Barracuda and the Challenger.
Forecasting a significant 15% Chrysler market share in this 1.5 million-unit segment for 1967, we projected sales of 225,000 cars annually. This promising outlook convinced management of the necessity to enter the pony car arena with competitive products. At that point, our sole offering was the Barracuda, which, while based on the Valiant fastback, lacked the distinct sporty proportions and unique appeal of the Mustang.
During a pivotal Corporate Product Planning Committee meeting, I confidently projected annual sales of 200,000 units for our new E-body cars. This figure resonated strongly with Manufacturing, as it perfectly aligned with a two eight-hour shift operation at 60 cars per hour. Finance also confirmed the profitability at this volume. Consequently, the program received the green light.
BUT – Reality proved to be starkly different.
We never even reached half of our ambitious sales target of 100,000 E-body cars per year. The compact specialty car market stabilized below the million-unit mark, and our E-body sales never achieved the anticipated 15% penetration. This shortfall translated to financial losses for the company and, regrettably, quality issues that dissatisfied customers.
The primary reasons for falling short of our projections were twofold: an overly optimistic market forecast and shortcomings in build quality. The styling, specifications, and pricing of the 1970 Barracuda and Challenger were generally well-received, but these factors alone couldn’t overcome the market headwinds and production challenges.
If I had the chance to revisit one decision from that era, it would undoubtedly be the approval of polypropylene door trim panels. While innovative in their time, these panels proved to be hard and uninviting to the touch. Moreover, dimensional inconsistencies between panels created significant headaches for Car Assembly. The material’s flexibility allowed assemblers to force-fit them, but this Band-Aid solution was far from ideal. Bob Steere, the Chief Engineer of Car Assembly, voiced strong reservations about this application of polypropylene, and his concerns were ultimately validated.
Despite the E-body’s underperformance, I managed to retain my position as Director of Product Planning. However, it seemed that every time John Riccardo, then President, saw a Barracuda or Challenger, his displeasure grew. Instead of a hoped-for promotion to Vice President, I found myself reporting to a new boss, George Butts, the newly appointed VP of Product Planning. In 1974, the Barracuda and Challenger were discontinued, marking the end of an era for these models, at least temporarily.
Following the “E-body fiasco,” as it was sometimes referred to internally, my career path at Highland Park seemed to have reached a dead end. Seeking new opportunities, I strategically transitioned into a top product role in Europe. This move proved to be a turning point, leading to two “European Cars of the Year” awards within four years. These accolades, surpassing competitors like BMW, Ford, GM, and Renault, significantly restored my professional confidence.
Today, it’s fascinating to witness the immense popularity of the E-body Barracudas and Challengers among younger generations and the glowing reviews of the 1970 models in the enthusiast press. It begs the question: where was this appreciation back in 1970?
The Barracuda’s lineage traces back to the A-body platform. Our prior experience with this approach highlighted limitations in achieving truly sporty proportions and accommodating larger B engines.
Did the integration of the bigger engine necessitate design changes beyond simply enlarging the engine bay? Indeed, opting for the B engine mandated a wider car. Furthermore, we incorporated additional width to accommodate larger wheels and tires. While this enhanced the vehicle’s stance and aesthetics, it inevitably added to the overall weight and production cost.
The Challenger and Barracuda programs were conceived with shared components in mind: door openings, windshield, cowl, and platform. The initial plan also included shared door outer skins, mirroring the A-body approach. However, during clay model development, we realized that adhering too strictly to interchangeability would compromise the Challenger’s unique visual identity. Consequently, the door skins became distinct to the Challenger, while the remaining shared components remained as planned. The Challenger was intentionally designed with a 2-3 inch longer wheelbase, similar to the Dart versus Valiant relationship, and was positioned with a $100 higher market price point.
Roger Struck, a Product Planner in Advance Product Planning (1965), later Dart/Challenger Product Planner (1967), and subsequently Manager of Coronet/Charger Product Planning (1968), offered his perspective.
The “E” Body project, from its inception in Advance Planning to the Challenger’s production phase, was a journey I personally witnessed and participated in. Initially envisioned as a light and agile “secretary’s car” under the direction of Cliff Voss, the concept evolved significantly.
The muscle car era was gaining momentum during the planning stages. The decision to incorporate the larger ‘B’ engines into the design led to a heavier and bulkier car, almost forcing a “semi-marriage” to the ‘B’ Body platform in terms of size and weight. By the time the 1970 Barracuda and Challenger reached the market, the muscle car trend was already waning. Rising insurance rates and growing safety concerns began to impact the market, creating a challenging environment for these powerful machines. One can’t help but wonder if maintaining the original light-and-nimble concept would have resulted in greater market success. Perhaps we wouldn’t have the fervent ‘Cuda cult following today, but it might have translated to greater profitability.
I recall a design review in the styling studio where Elwood Engle, VP of design, was evaluating the “E Body” Challenger clay model’s exterior. Elwood suggested to Bill Brownlie, Dodge’s design chief, that the main character line along the side, what we called the “B” line, appeared too low and should be raised to eliminate a perceived “dragging” appearance.
Another distinctive feature of the Challenger was its full-width rear taillights. We considered them to be cutting-edge, possibly an industry first at the time.
On the less successful side were the interior trim panels. Colin Neale, chief of interior design, favored the sculpted aesthetic of the molded plastic door trim panels. He assured us that a textured surface would “soften” the hard feel of the molded panel. However, texture or not, the panels remained hard to the touch, a characteristic reminiscent of the interior plastics in the later [2008] Sebring. While offering cost advantages and design flexibility, the hard plastic lacked tactile appeal, provided no sound dampening, and amplified door rattles.
European Cars of the Year:
- 1976 – C6: Chrysler Alpine / Simca 1307 / Simca 1308
- 1977 – Rover 3500
- 1978 – Porsche 928
- 1979 – C2: Chrysler Horizon
Bill Wetherholt, on the production line, recalls: The doors for these models were remarkably heavy, weighing 87 pounds before hardware and glass were installed. Overhead cranes with hooks were intended to assist in maneuvering the doors onto assembly racks. However, these cranes were often malfunctioning, requiring workers to manually lift and position the heavy doors. Modern automotive plants now utilize automation, eliminating manual door handling entirely. Doors are placed on rollers, and operators simply guide them into position.
Burton Bouwkamp interview | Bill Wetherholt interview
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